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What Were They Thinking?: Competing Culpability
Standards For Punishing Threats Made To The President
CRAIG MATTHEW PRINCIPE1
I. INTRODUCTION

1

8 U.S.C. Section 871(a) criminalizes the act of
making threats to kill, injure, or kidnap the President
of the United States and a few other officials who are
close in the line of succession.2 In its 1970 panel and
1971 en banc decisions in United States v. Patillo,3 the Fourth
Circuit became the first to adopt a subjective construction of
Section 871(a), creating its infamous “present intent” requirement.4 All other circuits presented with the task of interpreting
Section 871(a), have adopted an objective construction of the
statute, which translates into a negligence standard for a criminal
statute—something criminal law typically disapproves of.5 The
result is a heavily imbalanced “circuit split” with only the Fourth
Circuit taking an independent stand on the issue of criminal
culpability for threats made under Section 871(a).6
Although this division has persisted for over thirty-five years without
resolution, 7 recent events force us
to reexamine the issue of the proper
culpability standard for the threats
against the president statute. On January
8, 2011, a gunman attempted to shoot and
kill Arizona Representative Gabrielle
Giffords at a public event.8 Investigators
identified Representative Giffords
as the target of the attack and noted
that the congresswoman had received
numerous threats.9 While Representative
Giffords was very fortunate to survive
the shooting despite serious injuries,
several other bystanders were injured and tragically killed,
including Chief Judge John M. Roll of the District Court
for Arizona, and nine-year old Christina Taylor Green.10 It
remains unclear whether the gunman, twenty-two-year-old
Jared Lee Loughner, was motivated by politics11 or a personal
nihilistic desire to create chaos.12 Pima County Sheriff Clarence
W. Dupnik caused controversy by blaming the shooting on
“vitriolic rhetoric” and a toxic political environment in
Arizona.13 Regardless of Loughner’s motivation, this tragic
event in Arizona has prompted Congress to amend the “Threats
against the President” statute to encompass members of
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Congress or members-of-Congress-elect.14 If this amendment
passes, the scope of this statute would expand, from two to four
persons at any given time to well over five hundred.15 Thus, the
debate over whether the “willfully” element of Section 871(a)
requires a subjective or objective construction has taken on a
new significance and needs to be addressed in light of these
developments.
This Article examines the holding of United States v. Patillo
and argues that if Congress amends Section 871(a), it should
also clarify the culpability standard for the statute. Specifically,
Congress must address what is meant by “willfully” and should
adopt the original holding of Patillo as the proper standard for
threats against the President. This analysis will reveal that the
Fourth Circuit’s holding in Patillo, like many other holdings
in threats cases, has been largely misinterpreted. A crucial
misunderstanding is that the present intent requirement applies
to all Section 871(a) cases.16 A primary
objective here is to parse out the core
holding of Patillo to delineate how the
Fourth Circuit identified a factual dichotomy of Section 871(a) cases where
the present intent standard applies to just
one of the two parts.17 This Article also
includes an empirical study of outcomes
in Section 871(a) threats cases, in order
to assess whether having two different
mens rea standards is problematic and
if so, which construction of Section
871(a)—subjective or objective—is
preferable.
The study compares outcomes
under the Fourth Circuit’s subjective standard with outcomes
under the other circuits’ objective standard by using data
from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Federal Criminal Case
Processing Statistics Database.18 Theoretically, a subjective standard essentially mandates that prosecutors prove an
additional specific intent requirement. Regardless of how the
requirement is defined,19 that additional element would make
it harder for prosecutors to prove their case. This in turn would
affect defendants’ decisions with respect to plea bargains. Thus,
this study looks at three measures that could indicate whether
the difference between a subjective regime and an objective
39

regime is a meaningful one: (1) the number of investigations
or arrests and bookings compared to the number of indictments
filed; (2) the number of cases filed compared with the number of
cases that either go to trial or result in pleas; and, (3) the results
at trial comparing rates of acquittal with guilty verdicts. In light
of the purposes of this statute and the empirical data comparing
the subjective and objective approaches to culpability under
Section 871(a), this Article concludes that the Patillo approach
best serves the state’s interests in protecting the President and
his movements, balancing those priorities with the greatest
amount of protection for individuals subject to the criminal
sanction of Section 871(a).

II. THREATS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT: THE
STATUTORY LANGUAGE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
EARLY CASES, AND THE RAGANSKY TEST
A. 18 U.S.C. SECTION 871 — THE STATUTE
CRIMINALIZING THREATS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT
The crucial language in 18 U.S.C. Section 871(a)
criminalizing threats to the President is that a true threat
be made “knowingly and willfully.”20 Section 871(a) states:
(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits for
conveyance in the mail or for a delivery from any
post office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper,
writing, print, missive, or document containing any
threat to take the life of, to kidnap, or to inflict bodily
harm upon the President of the United States, the
President-elect, the Vice President or other officer next
in the order of succession to the office of President
of the United States, or the Vice President-elect, or
knowingly and willfully otherwise makes any such
threat against the President, President-elect, Vice
President or other officer next in the order of succession to the office of President, or Vice President-elect,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.21
This section prohibits two forms of threats against the
President—by mailing “any letter, paper, writing, print, missive,
or document containing any threat” or “otherwise mak[ing] any
such threat. . . ” 22 Regardless of the method used to convey the
threat, both require that it be made “knowingly and willfully.”23
Both the Supreme Court in Watts v. United States (1969)
and the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Patillo (1971)
emphasize that within this “knowingly and willfully” requirement, “willfully” is the decisive source of the mens rea of the
statute.24 The Supreme Court in United States v. Murdock25
explains that willfully “often denotes an act which is intentional,
40

or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental.
But when used in a criminal statute it generally means an
act done with a bad purpose,” which correlates to criminal
blameworthiness.26

B. CONTEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
18 U.S.C. SECTION 871
The Threats against the President statute was passed on
February 14, 1917.27 The law has been on the books for almost
one hundred years, yet the original language is essentially the
same as it was then.28 Most significantly, Congress used the same
“knowingly and willfully” language that appears in the statute
today.29 At that time, three United States Presidents had been
assassinated in office: Abraham Lincoln in 1865, James Garfield
in 1881, and William McKinley in 1901.30 Theodore Roosevelt,
who became President upon the assassination of McKinley, was
also the target of a failed assassination attempt while running
for a third term in 1912 on the Progressive ticket.31 Such events
undoubtedly influenced the House Judiciary Committee members that sponsored the law. In fact, the committee report stated
that the bill, H.R. 15314, was “designed to restrain and punish
those who would threaten to take the life of, or inflict bodily
harm upon, the President of this Republic.”32 The report also
stated, “It is the first and highest duty of a Government to
protect its governmental agencies, in the performance of their
public services, from threats of violence which would tend to
coerce them or restrain them in the performance of their duties.”33
During debates in the House of Representatives, the chief
sponsor of the bill, Representative Edwin Yates Webb,34 was
forced to defend the “willfully” phraseology.35 As Chairman
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, he was intimately
familiar with the bill.36 After the bill was read by the Clerk,
Representative Raker asked Webb whether, “in line 3 the words
‘and willfully’ and the same words in lines 8 and 9 ought to be
stricken from the bill, for the reason that if a man knowing [sic]
does an act, that ought to be sufficient to punish him.”37 Webb
responded:
I do not think so . . . I think he ought to be shown to
have done it willfully. I think it must be a willful intent
to do serious injury to the President. If you make it
a mere technical offense, you do not give him much
of a chance when he comes to answer before a court
and jury. I do not think we ought to be too anxious to
convict a man who does a thing thoughtlessly. I think
it ought to be a willful expression of an intent to carry
out a threat against the Executive, and I hope that the
gentleman will not offer his amendment.38
Webb expressed his belief that the crime to be punished
by this language was meant to require more than knowingly making a threat; it also required some form of
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criminal culpability, which according to Webb should have
been the “intent to carry out a threat against the Executive.”39 He
emphasized, “[t]his is the language used in nearly all the
statutes where the intent constitutes the crime. You find it in
the statutes against murder and embezzlement, and I had rather
keep the word ‘willfully’ in.”40
Representative Volstead, also responding to Raker’s
suggestion of eliminating willfully, stated that “[t]he word
‘willful’ conveys, as ordinarily used, the idea of wrongful as
well as intentional.”41 He also illustrated the harm that might
befall someone if the word willfully were taken out of the bill.42
He said:
This statute does not require that the instrument shall
be sent to the President. It might be sent to some other
person. If, as the gentleman suggests, you strike out the
word ‘willfully,’ a person who simply sends an instrument, say, a newspaper that contains such a threat, to
some friend to call his attention to the matter, would
do so knowingly, and would come within the language
of this bill.43
In articulating this concern, Volstead raised a factual matter
which influenced the Patillo court’s holding decades later—“a
true threat against the person of the President . . . uttered without
communication to the President intended.”44 In other words, the
factual situation common in Section 871(a) cases, where the
threat was not mailed to or spoken to the President or the Secret
Service, but rather was mailed or spoken to some other person
such as a friend, stranger, or coworker. The significance of this
factual distinction and the relevance of willfulness in punishing
such threats will be discussed in the section on Patillo below.
Interestingly, the significance of this debate and the early
cases construing the statute figured prominently in D.C. Circuit
Judge J. Skelly Wright’s dissent in Watts v. United States.45 This
dissent was referenced later by the Supreme Court’s per curiam
opinion when it reversed the D.C. Circuit and disposed of the
case based upon the true threats analysis established by that
landmark First Amendment decision, but not before the Court
expressed its “grave doubts” about an objective standard for
willfulness.46 In his dissent, Wright argues that courts should
look to the legislative history for Section 871(a), particularly
Webb’s statements, when performing statutory construction of
Section 871(a).47
In a footnote, Wright stated, “[a] statute punishing a ‘threat’
made ‘knowingly and willfully’ is hardly so unambiguous as to
preclude looking to the legislative history for clarification of
the mental element required.”48 Wright was seemingly aware
of the judicial canon of statutory construction which says that
“[w]here . . . resolution of a question of federal law turns on a
statute and the intention of Congress, [the Court] look[s] first
to the statutory language and then to the legislative history if
Criminal Law Brief

the statutory language is unclear,”49 and was therefore seeking
to justify his reliance on Webb’s statement, given on the floor
of the House. Wright goes on to argue that “[w]hat is clear is
that Congressman Webb . . . insisted upon a specific intent to
execute the threat. Because of the obvious dangers posed by the
statute, and amply illustrated by the history of its use, I consider
the narrower view of the mental element the proper one.”50 In
his dissent, Wright laments the fact that the early cases which
construed the law in 1917-18 “largely ignored” that “Congress
considered specific intent to execute the threat an element of
the offense.”51

C. RAGANSKY V. UNITED STATES — THE EARLY
CASE THAT SET THE STANDARD
Ragansky v. United States,52 decided in 1918 by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, has become
a seminal case in interpreting Section 871(a); it is known for
creating the Ragansky Test. Walter Ragansky was charged
and convicted on three counts of threatening the life of the
President.53 His alleged threats were made orally in the presence
of third-parties.54 The first count of the indictment alleged that
Ragansky said, “I can make bombs and I will make bombs and
blow up the President.”55 The second count stated that he said,
“We ought to make the biggest bomb in the world and take it
down to the White House and put it on the dome and blow up
President Wilson and all the rest of the crooks, and get President
Wilson and all of the rest of the crooks and blow it up.”56 The
third count alleged that Ragansky said, “I would like to make a
bomb big enough to blow up the Capitol and President and all
the Senators and everybody in it.”57
Virtually every case and article citing Ragansky, mentions the statement made in the first count of the indictment,58
despite the fact that the other two statements contain language
of hyperbole. This is curious because Ragansky’s defense was
that his statements were actually made in jest and that the jury
charge ignored the word willfully in the statute.59 As the court
noted, Ragansky’s claim “appear[ed] to have been that [he]
had no intention to carry out his threat, and that, therefore, it
was a joke.”60 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit upheld the
conviction based upon the jury instruction that had been given.61
Furthermore, the court elaborated on the meaning of the phrase
“knowingly and willfully,”62 and its brief statement of those
terms has since formed the basis of the Ragansky Test.
The Seventh Circuit first stated that “[a] threat is knowingly
made, if the maker of it comprehends the meaning of the words
uttered by him; a foreigner, ignorant of the English language,
repeating these same words without knowledge of their meaning, may not knowingly have made a threat.”63 Next, the court
stated that, “[a] threat is willfully made, if in addition to comprehending the meaning of his words [(i.e., knowingly)], the maker
voluntarily and intentionally utters them as the declaration of
41

an apparent determination to carry them into execution.”64 An
“apparent determination” is an objective standard by which
the fact finder must look at the words stated and then consider
what a reasonable person would believe the speaker meant by
those words.65 If the reasonable person believes the speaker was
making a serious threat, then that is proof that the threat was
made willfully. The test also incorporates a negligence standard,
according to the Seventh Circuit, which rejected the notion that
a prosecutor must prove the defendant “used [such language]
with an evil or malicious intent to express a sentiment to be
impressed upon the minds of persons through which it might
create a sentiment of hostility to the security of the President,
‘that willfully implies an evil purpose—legal malice.’”66

fifteen of the opinion en banc, the court wrote and held the
following:

III. UNITED STATES V. PATILLO—THE
MISUNDERSTOOD AND OFTEN OVERSIMPLIFIED HOLDING
OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REGARDING SECTION 871(A)

This passage is so crucial to properly understanding the
holding of Patillo that it must be analyzed one sentence at a
time. First, the court identifies two categories of Section 871
cases based upon the facts of such cases: those where the
defendant communicates his threat directly “to the President
intended” (e.g., by speaking or mailing a threat directly to the
President or the Secret Service) and those where the defendant does not communicate his threat directly to the President
intended (e.g., by mailing a letter or saying something to a
friend, stranger, or other third-party).77 The court identifies
Patillo’s case as falling into the second category.78 Next, the
court says that because the Patillo case does not involve the
communication of a threat directly to the President intended,
the court “do[es] not here consider what intent requirement may
be effective to accomplish an insulation of the President from
threats of violence to his person” under those conditions.79 This
statement strongly indicates that the Fourth Circuit’s holding in
Patillo was only meant to apply to the second category of cases:
threats not directed to the President intended.
The Fourth Circuit’s own statement of the holding supports
this interpretation. The court states, “[w]e hold that where, as in
Patillo’s case, a true threat against the person of the President is
uttered without communication to the President intended,” (i.e.,
category two only), “the threat can form a basis for conviction
under the terms of Section 871(a) only if made with a present
intent to do injury to the President.”80 Thus, a careful reading
of the holding in Patillo suggests that it should be narrowly
applied to only one of two categories of Section 871(a) cases,
not to all Section 871(a) cases generally.
This view that the Patillo holding created a factual
dichotomy approach to analysis of Section 871(a) cases is
acknowledged by the Fourth Circuit’s opinion thirty years later
in United States v. Spring.81 In Spring, the court used Patillo as
a basis of comparison, citing, “Cf. Patillo, 431 F.2d at 297-98
(distinguishing among threats against the President based
on whether they were transmitted (or were intended to be

In United States v. Patillo, decided by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by a panel decision
in 1970 and an en banc decision in 1971, the defendant Patillo
appealed his conviction on two counts of threatening the life
of the President of the United States in violation of Section
871(a).67 The district judge, in a bench trial, had found that
Patillo made unlawful threats against President Nixon on two
occasions while on duty as a security guard at the Norfolk Naval
Shipyard.68 On May 16, 1969, he allegedly said to another guard
“with whom he was only casually acquainted” that he was
“going to kill President Nixon, and [was] going to Washington
to do it.”69 This statement was reported to a supervisor who
then informed the Secret Service.70 On May 22, 1969, a Secret
Service agent was “secreted in the trunk of a patrol car”
operated by Patillo and the same coworker.71 According to testimony at trial, Patillo allegedly said “I will take care of [Nixon]
personally,” and “would gladly give up [my] life doing it.”72
After considering a recently decided case assessing the intent
requirement for 18 U.S.C. Section 871(a), (i.e., Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969)), the Fourth Circuit concluded that
Patillo was “tried in accordance with legal principles that we
have found to be erroneous,” and thus reversed and remanded
his case for a new trial.73
Other opinions and secondary sources widely note that
United States v. Patillo established a subjective “present intent”
requirement for Section 871(a) offenses.74 This, however, is an
oversimplification of the court’s holding. The specific language
of Patillo demands greater inspection because it suggests that
Patillo’s present intent requirement was meant to have a more
narrow or limited application; it was not meant to apply to all
Section 871(a) cases generally.75 In a crucial paragraph on page
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This case does not involve the communication, or
attempted communication, by a defendant of his threat
to the President. Accordingly, we do not here consider
what intent requirement may be effective to accomplish an insulation of the President from threats of
violence to his person and also be in accordance with
the wording of Section 871(a). We hold that where,
as in Patillo’s case, a true threat against the person of
the President is uttered without communication to the
President intended the threat can form a basis for conviction under the terms of Section 871(a) only if made
with a present intent to do injury to the President.76
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transmitted) to the President or to a third party).”82 Although
this statement validates the approach described above, it is a
mere indirect reference to the dichotomy created by the holding. No reported case in the Fourth Circuit or elsewhere has
expressly acknowledged the true holding of Patillo.
The significance of this dichotomy and the Fourth Circuit’s
holding, requires further explanation. After stating its holding,
the Patillo court discussed the purpose of the statute and the
three ways of proving the present intent requirement in category
two cases.83 The court wrote:
We agree with [the Second and Ninth Circuits] that the
statute was designed to prevent a secondary evil other
than actual assaults upon the President or incitement
to assault the President, and that it is a legitimate area
of congressional concern to prevent and make criminal
disruption of presidential activity and movement that
may result simply from publication of an apparent
threat upon the President’s life. When a threat is published with an intent to disrupt presidential activity, we
think there is sufficient mens rea under the secondary
sanction of the statute.84
In this passage, the Fourth Circuit acknowledges that there
is a secondary sanction of the statute—the disruption of presidential activity.85 Furthermore, the court rejects the Ragansky
Test of intention—although properly understood, this rejection
only applies to category two cases.86
For category two cases, the court describes three theories
of a Section 871 offense:
We think that an essential element of guilt is a present
intention either to injure the President, or incite others
to injure him, or to restrict his movements, and that
the trier of fact may find the latter intention from the
nature of the publication of the threat, i.e., whether the
person making the threat might reasonably anticipate
that it would be transmitted to law enforcement officers
and others charged with the security of the President.87
The phrase “the latter intention” refers to the third theory of
the offense for category two cases: restricting the movements of
the President.88 The court notes, “Much of what we say here is
dicta justified, we think, by apparent misunderstanding of our
prior panel decision. For Patillo was not prosecuted on a theory
of intention to disrupt presidential activity and the nature of
publication of his threat would scarcely support it.”89
The use of the term “publication” is somewhat confusing
since Patillo did not mail or publish a threat, but was indicted
for allegedly making verbal statements to a coworker on two
separate occasions while the two security guards were on night
patrol at a Norfolk based Naval Shipyard.90 Nevertheless, the
court’s distinction of Patillo’s case, which was prosecuted
Criminal Law Brief

under a theory of “present intention to injure the President,” as
compared to the Ninth and Second Circuit decisions referred
to in the opinion, which were prosecuted under a theory of
“present intention to disrupt presidential activity,” is a very
important one.91 It is a distinction which acknowledges the
nuances of both the factual dichotomy of Section 871(a) cases
noted above and the three different theories of prosecution
under Section 871(a). It also helps inform the Patillo court’s
demarcation of category one and category two cases.
The framework of Section 871(a) offenses post-Patillo can
be viewed as follows:
CATEGORY

THEORY OF
OFFENSE

INTENT REQUIRED

ONE:
Verbal or
Written Threats
Directed to the
President

(1) to injure
the President

The Fourth Circuit did not
make a holding on this issue
in Patillo and thus deferred
deciding whether there is a
subjective present intent requirement or some form of an
objective intent requirement.

ONE:
Verbal or Written Threats
Directed to the
President

(2) to incite
others to
injure the
President

The Fourth Circuit did not
make a holding on this issue
in Patillo and thus deferred
deciding whether there is a
subjective present intent requirement or some form of an
objective intent requirement.

TWO:
Verbal or
Written Threats
Not Directed
to the President

(1) to injure
the President

Must prove defendant had—
at the time the threat was
made—the present intent to
injure the President at some
point in the future.

TWO:
Verbal or
Written Threats
Not Directed
to the President

(2) to incite
others to
injure the
President

Must prove defendant had—
at the time the threat was
made—the present intent
to incite other to injure the
President at some point in
the future.

TWO:
Verbal or
Written Threats
Not Directed
to the President

(3) to disrupt
presidential
activity or the
movements of
the President

Must prove defendant had—
at the time the threat was
made—the present intent to
disrupt presidential activity
or the movements of the President. This can be demonstrated
by showing that the defendant
published or uttered a statement
that is a true threat, with an
intent to disrupt presidential
activity (e.g., calling the police,
calling a telephone operator).92

Patillo’s case falls under category two and was prosecuted
under theory one (see table above). Therefore, the court’s
specific concern in Patillo was what intent requirement best
suits a defendant who makes a verbal statement to a coworker,
not directly to the President intended or to persons in authority
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positions likely to convey such information to the Secret Service
or Office of the President. The court writes:
As to Patillo’s case which is quite different from Roy’s
and Compton’s, we adhere to the panel decision . . .
adding to it only that the trier of fact may, of course,
consider all relevant facts concerning the background
of the defendant, his motives, the manner in which the
threat was made, and the reaction of those who heard
the threat and thus have an opportunity to form an
opinion about the speaker’s present intention to injure
the President of the United States.93
Because of the significant effort the court makes to clearly
distinguish between category one and two, and between theories
of the offense for category two, these factors must apply only to
cases prosecuted under category two.
These distinctions are sensible because Section 871(a) has
the potential to criminalize a wide variety of writings or verbal
statements made in vastly different contexts and directed to
many different types of people. The Fourth Circuit in Patillo
was most concerned with establishing a proper standard for
individuals making statements that could be perceived as true
threats, in casual conversation with individuals not in a position
of authority, or likely to transmit such statements to the Secret
Service or the Office of the President.94 In such factual scenarios,
the Fourth Circuit deemed it necessary that the individual uttering a true threat must have the present intent at the time the
statement was made, to injure the President at some point in the
future, including injuring the President by disrupting his future
movements.95
This present intent requirement would effectively sort out
those for punishment who were truly culpable under category
two cases (those not made directly to the President intended), by
dividing persons making true threats into two groups: first, those
who are culpable, because they wrote or uttered true threats
and meant to injure the President or carry out those threats at
a future point in time, and second, those who are not culpable,
because even though they wrote or uttered true threats, they had
no present intention to actually injure the President or carry out
those threats. A careful and scrutinizing reading of the Patillo
opinion, however, indicates that such factors have limited
application to category two cases and do not apply to category
one cases. Thus, category one cases might still be subject to
an objective intent standard or a more relaxed subjective intent
standard (intent to make a true threat, though not necessarily
with the intent to injure the President or to carry out the threat)
even under Patillo.

IV. 18 U.S.C. § 879 AND CONGRESS’S INITIAL
RESPONSE TO THE CULPABILITY CONTROVERSY IN
§ 871(A) CASE LAW
Other federal criminal statutes prohibiting threats can be
found in several sections of the United States Code, including 18 U.S.C. Sections 112(b) (threatening a foreign official),
115 (threatening a Federal official, judge, or law enforcement
officer or member of their immediate family), 844(e) (threatened
use of arson or explosive), 871 (threats against the President and
successor to the Presidency), 875 (threats contained in interstate
communications), 876 (mailing threatening communications),
877 (mailing threatening communications from a foreign
country), 878 (threats against foreign officials, official guests,
or internationally protected persons), and 879 (threats against
former Presidents and certain other persons).96 In addition to
Section 871(a), Sections 878 and 879 use the phraseology of
“knowingly and willfully.”97
Section 878 punishes “Whoever knowingly and willfully
threatens to violate section 112, 1116, or 1201 . . . under [Title
18].”98 18 U.S.C. Section 879 is actually a counterpart to Section
871 and was patterned off of it.99 Section 879 extends the protections of Section 871 from just the President and successor
to the Presidency to include former Presidents and the immediate family of a former President, the immediate family of the
President, the President-elect, the Vice President, or the Vice
President-elect, a major candidate for the office of President or
Vice President, or a member of the immediate family of such a
candidate, or any person protected by the Secret Service under
Section 3056(a)(6).100 Section 879 also uses the same exact
phraseology “knowingly and willfully.”101
Interestingly, Section 879 was passed in 1982,102 whereas
§ 871 was passed more than a half-century earlier.103 Thus
Congress was well aware of the controversy that had arisen in
the aftermath of Watts regarding the proper culpability standard. This is evident from the House of Representatives Report
97-725 in which the Judiciary Committee stated that:
The committee is aware that the term ‘knowingly and
willfully’ as used in Section 871 has not been uniformly
construed by the courts. Some courts have broadly
construed the term, in accord with the explicit purpose of the legislation to prevent interference with the
conduct of presidential duties, and have not required
evidence of intent to carry out the threatened act. . .
. One court has required evidence of an individual’s
intent to carry out the threat [(referring to Patillo in
a footnote)].104
Although Congress acknowledged the circuit split on this
issue, their one line reference to the holding of Patillo is an

44
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oversimplification of the standard set by the Patillo court, as
this analysis has shown. Furthermore, Congress did nothing
to address Section 871(a), only to put a different standard for
“willfully” in Section 879.105
Indeed, the committee went on to say, “With regard to
Section 879 . . . the committee construes a threat that is ‘knowingly and willfully’ made as one which the maker intends to be
perceived as a threat regardless of whether he or she intends
to carry it out.”106 As expressed
through a footnote, the committee essentially adopted Justice
Marshall’s subjective construction—requiring proof of subjective intent to make a true threat,
but not necessarily to carry out
that threat.107 The committee justified its implementation of Section
879 because of the fact that “[t]he
investigation and prosecution of
such threats has been hampered
because of a lack of an applicable
federal statute similar to the presidential threat statute.”108
When comparing different
threats statutes, confusion often
arises. One source of confusion is caused by a blending of the
true threats analysis with the mens rea requirements of a given
threats statute. Each specific statement of law in a given case
may not be an error in and of itself. Yet, the blending together
of such tests for the purposes of one case, often leads to confusion when the language of those opinions or jury instructions
laying out the blended test are then relied upon in other cases or
jurisdictions dealing with the same or a different threats statute.
This problem has been recognized in some secondary sources.109
True threats tests ensure compliance with First Amendment
protections while mens rea culpability requirements set the bar
for what non-constitutionally-protected verbal or non-verbal
utterances are blameworthy under the purposes of the statute
involved. As a matter of legal analysis, it makes sense to
draw a line in the sand on this issue and to consider each test
independently, rather than blend the inquiries together.110 Such
clarity could assist judges and lawmakers in developing the law
of threats in a manner that minimizes confusion and maximizes
just and constitutional principles.

are three operating standards for the willfulness element of
Section 871(a). The first and largest category is the Roy/Ragansky
standard to which nine circuits clearly adhere.111 Although,
the First Circuit has not clearly decided the issue, it seems to
favor the Roy/Ragansky standard.112 The second and third categories are both subjective standards, but both are “categories
of one”: the Fourth Circuit’s Patillo standard and the Eighth
Circuit’s Marshall Test.113

Such clarity could assist

judges and lawmakers in

developing the law of threats
in a manner that minimizes

confusion and maximizes just

A. THE RAGANSKY
TEST AS EXPRESSED IN
ROY AND ADOPTED IN
OTHER CIRCUITS
In Roy v. United States,
decided by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
1969, the court elaborated a standard based on the 1918 Ragansky
Test.114 The court wrote:

This Court therefore construes the willfulness requirement of [18 U.S.C.
§ 871(a)] to require only
that the defendant intentionally make a statement, written or oral, in a
context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement
would be interpreted by those to whom the maker
communicates the statement as a serious expression of
an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the
life of the President, and that the statement not be the
result of mistake, duress, or coercion. The statute does
not require that the defendant actually intend to carry
out the threat.115

and constitutional principles.

V. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT — § 871(A)
ACROSS THE CIRCUITS TODAY
Analyzing the United States Courts of Appeal for the First
through Eleventh Circuits and the D.C. Circuit reveals that there
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Circuits adopting the Roy/Ragansky standard sometimes
use language more akin to that used in Ragansky,116 although
regardless of the language, the test objectively views the words
written or spoken from the perspective of a reasonable person.
For example, in United States v. Compton, the Second Circuit expressly approved117 of the lower courts jury instruction
which read:
[I]f it found that a true threat was made, it must further
find that the threat was made ‘knowingly and willfully,’ and that ‘the government must establish beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant comprehended
the words he uttered, that he voluntarily and intentionally uttered them with the apparent determination
to carry them into execution.’ . . . ‘Although for a find-
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ing of guilt it is not necessary for you to find that the
defendant actually intended to carry out the threat.’118
This instruction replicates the language of the Ragansky Test
for willfulness.119 Yet, the Second Circuit cited Roy, not
Ragansky, in its opinion.120 It expressed agreement with the
Ninth Circuit’s Roy standard and that standard adopted by the
District of Columbia Circuit, while simultaneously approving
the jury charge stated above based on Ragansky.121
Then in a subsequent decision by the Second Circuit, the
court noted that under Compton, “this court adopt[s] the objective test set forth in Roy . . .”122 The Second Circuit also stated
that “[i]t is well settled that § 871 requires only a showing
of general intent.”123 Following the Ninth Circuit in Roy, this
standard—here referred to as the Roy/Ragansky Test—was
adopted by the Second,124 Third,125 Fifth, 126 Sixth,127 Seventh,128
Tenth,129 Eleventh,130 and D.C. Circuits.131 The First Circuit
has not expressly addressed this direct issue on appeal, but has
implied a preference for the objective standard.132

B. THE SUBJECTIVE INTENT CIRCUITS —
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S PRESENT INTENT
REQUIREMENT AND THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S
MARSHALL TEST
In United States v. Frederickson, decided by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 1979, the court
reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence in a Section 871(a)
case on appeal.133 The court explained:
Here the district court[‘s charge to the jury] adopted
the construction of section 871 enunciated by Mr.
Justice Marshall in his concurring opinion in Rogers
v. United States, []. As no objection was made to those
instructions, the Rogers view of the statute constitutes
the law of this case, against which we measure the
sufficiency of the evidence.
Thus, for the purposes of this case, to obtain a conviction under section 871 the Government was
required to establish ‘that the defendant appreciated
the threatening nature of his statement and intended
at least to convey the impression that the threat was
a serious one.’134
The Eighth Circuit was apparently trying only to resolve
the case before it and seemed to be going out of its way to
emphasize that the Marshall Test from Rogers was not the
newly adopted standard of the Eighth Circuit.135 Nevertheless,
this exemplifies how a limited holding has been given a life
beyond its original holding.
In United States v. Cvijanovich, decided in 2009, the Eighth
Circuit stated that under Section 871(a), “[t]he government must
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establish ‘that the defendant appreciated the threatening nature
of his statement and intended at least to convey the impression that the threat was a serious one.’”136 The court cites its
Frederickson opinion for support and quotes from the language
of Justice Marshall’s concurring opinion in Rogers.137 Thus,
the Marshall Test appears to be Eighth Circuit law, despite the
limitations originally placed on the holding in Frederickson.
While this standard is a subjective standard, it is not quite the
same as the Patillo test, which requires not simply a subjective
intent to make a true threat, but a subjective present intent to
carry out the threat or injure the President.138 Therefore, while
both the Patillo (as applied to category two cases) and the
Marshall tests are subjective, the quantum of proof required to
establish the subjective intent element of the Patillo test is a
much higher burden—or at least is presumed to be theoretically.
The Patillo holding and the present intent standard has
been laid out in detail above and need not be repeated; however,
it is worth noting at this point that the court in Patillo, when
comparing its standard to that in Roy, stated, “[i]t was in [the
same] context that the Ninth Circuit opinion contained the statement: ‘The statute does not require that the defendant actually
intend to carry out the threat.’ . . . Our panel decision in this case
is not to the contrary.”139 How can one reconcile the statement
that their Patillo decision was not contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s
Roy standard? Presumably, the Patillo court was creating (or
thought it was creating) a limited holding that distinguished
Roy from Patillo, and was not establishing a different standard
for category one cases like Roy. Since other circuits, secondary
sources, and even the Fourth Circuit’s subsequent cases have
not clearly and explicitly acknowledged this dichotomy, for the
purposes of the following empirical analysis, it will be presumed
that the present intent standard has been applied uniformly to
all Fourth Circuit cases, regardless of the factual circumstances
of each case. This may prove to be a faulty assumption, but it
is necessary to attempt a cross-circuit comparison of Section
871(a) standards using the data which is available.

VI. AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF
A PRESENT INTENT STANDARD ON INVESTIGATIONS,
PROSECUTIONS, AND VERDICTS IN § 871 CASES
Theoretically, anything that adds to the burden of proof
for a given offense should affect the decisions investigators,
prosecutors, defendants, and defense attorneys make. As additional elements are added—such as a specific intent element—
or as the mens rea requirement becomes difficult or complex
to prove, one would expect that investigators would convert
fewer investigations to arrests, prosecutors would file charges
in a smaller percentage of investigations, that defendants would
take their chances going to trial more often, and that sentences
Spring 2012

would be proportionate to the degree of culpability or criminal blameworthiness. This is the framework from which this
empirical study was developed.
These assumptions, on their face, are reasonable. For
example, the Third Circuit noted in United States v. Kosma
that “[a] subjective test makes it considerably more difficult
for the government to prosecute threats against the President.
While this might be tolerable in other contexts, the compelling,
and indeed paramount, interest in safeguarding the President
dictates otherwise,” thus justifying the adoption of an objective
standard.140 It is also important to note that much of the scholarly discussion of the law of threats is based upon assumptions
that the standards we choose will actually have an impact in
the application of the law. This makes such an empirical study
important, because it affords an opportunity to examine what is
actually happening in practice, and to determine whether theory
aligns with reality.
This empirical study is based upon the analysis of data
from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Federal Criminal Case
Processing Statistics database.141 Three measures were used
to test whether the Fourth Circuit’s present intent standard, as
compared with all other circuits, has resulted in differences
in: (1) the number of investigations or arrests and bookings
compared to the number of indictments filed; (2) the number
of cases filed compared with the number of cases that either go
to trial or result in pleas; and, (3) the results at trial comparing
rates of acquittal with guilty verdicts.

A. MEASURE ONE: FROM INVESTIGATION
OR ARREST TO INDICTMENT
During the twelve-year period of 1998 to 2009, there
were 2,224 investigations concluded for threats made against
the President.142 Of those investigations, prosecutors declined
prosecutions seventy-eight percent of the time and cases were
filed eighteen percent of the time.143 Unfortunately, due to the
nature in which investigations data is tracked, the data cannot be
categorized by circuit. The only way to make circuit-to-circuit
comparisons of defendants moving from the investigatory
stage to the prosecutorial stage is by comparing, by circuit,
arrests to indictments and felony information proceedings. The
arrests data did not include the variable specifically for threats
against the President, but only for threatening communications;
therefore, to best approximate the number of arrests for threats
against the President by circuit, a special formula was used;144
there is likely some error, leaning towards an underestimation
of the total number of arrests.
The analysis of the conversion rate from arrests to indictments produced the following results: of 390 total arrests across
all circuits, there were 337 indictments filed, which is an 86.41
percent conversion rate; of forty arrests in the Fourth Circuit,
forty indictments were filed, which is a one hundred percent
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conversion rate; of the 350 arrests across all other circuits, there
were 329 indictments filed, which is an 84.86 percent conversion
rate.145 These results do not correspond with the theoretical
expectation that the more elements one must prove, or the more
difficult the mens rea is to prove, the less likely prosecutors will
be to accept cases. While the percentage breakdown may suffer
from some degree of error, it is clear that the Fourth Circuit
conversion rate is above the average and the all other circuit
conversion rate is just below the average. Regardless of degree,
the opposite arrangement was expected. There are two alternative explanations for these results. First, it is possible that due
to the higher burden of proof, agents have grown accustomed
to the heightened requirements of the Fourth Circuit’s standard,
and thus only arrest suspects when it is believed that a solid
case has been built. A second possibility is that the distinction
between an objective and a subjective mens rea standard does
not actually translate into a perceptible difference in practice.

B. MEASURE TWO: FROM INDICTMENT TO TRIAL
The second potential measure of a difference between
the Fourth Circuit standard and that of other circuits is the
rate at which defendants pursue trial versus making a plea.
The extraordinarily high conviction rate of the United States
Attorney’s Office is well known. The overall conviction rate
from 1998 to 2009 is 893,187 convictions out of 999,412 cases,
or 89.37 percent.146 The Fourth Circuit, however, has the lowest
conviction rate among all the circuits: 89,971 convictions out
of 111,905 cases, or 80.40 percent.147 This, combined with the
Fourth Circuit’s present intent requirement for Section 871(a),
would suggest that more defendants and defense attorneys
would pursue going to trial over taking a plea and would likely
prefer a jury trial over a bench trial. This second assumption,
however, is based on the presumption that it would be harder
to convince a jury of twelve lay persons to convict rather than
one judge.
The data, however, does not reflect this assumption. In
the Fourth Circuit, only 8.11 percent of cases proceed to trial,
compared with 12.16 percent in all other circuits from 1998
to 2009.148 More surprisingly, only three cases went to trial in
the Fourth Circuit in that same twelve-year period.149 Of those
three cases, two were tried before a judge, and only one was
tried before a jury.150 The jury trial resulted in an acquittal and
the two bench trials resulted in guilty convictions.151 Due to the
small number of Section 871(a) cases which go to trial overall,
especially in the Fourth Circuit, it is difficult to tell whether
these conversion rates are significant in testing the hypothesis that the Fourth Circuit’s present intent requirement would
result in more cases going to trial and more acquittals. There are
also other alternatives to consider, such as the possibility that
the difference between an objective mens rea standard and a
subjective mens rea standard is not all that different in practice.
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The fact that more than half of all defendants in other circuits who went
to trial were acquitted is astonishing. It reveals the inherent difficulty
of prosecuting Threats against the President cases in general. It also
questions the assumption that proving an objective standard will be easy.
Another possibility is that federal prosecutors are very adept
in selecting cases with sufficient evidence to prosecute; thus,
regardless of the standard employed by the circuit, the results
turn out similarly.

importantly, once the acquittal and conviction rates are isolated,
they became more equalized, rather than polarized. This further
adds to the evidence that the subjective and objective distinction
is not a meaningful one in application.

C. MEASURE THREE: RESULTS AT TRIAL
As indicated in the section above, defendants in the Fourth
Circuit have not fared well at trial, with two out of three
defendants being convicted in the last twelve years and only
one acquitted.152 In the Fourth Circuit, sixty-seven percent
of defendants at trial were convicted and thirty-three percent
acquitted compared with forty-five percent of defendants in all
other circuits convicted and fifty-five percent acquitted.153 The
fact that more than half of all defendants in other circuits who
went to trial were acquitted is astonishing. It reveals the inherent
difficulty of prosecuting Threats against the President cases
in general. It also questions the assumption that proving an
objective standard will be easy. This data indicates that in
practice there is far less of a distinction between subjective and
objective willfulness standards in Section 871(a) cases than
commentators and judges previously thought.
In order to test whether the data is just too small to properly
measure the distinction between the Patillo standard and the
other standards, which do not require a showing of intent to
injure the President or carry out the threat, an additional comparison was made. Fourth Circuit and Eighth Circuit (soft
subjective standard) data were combined and compared against
all other circuits (limited to the Roy/Ragansky standard). This
analysis shows a slightly different outcome, but not dramatically
so. When combining Fourth and Eighth Circuit data, defendants who went to trial on a subjective standard were acquitted
fifty-seven percent (four of seven) of the time and convicted
forty-three percent (three of seven).154 This compares with fiftytwo percent of defendants (fourteen of twenty-seven) acquitted
under the Roy/Ragansky Test and forty-eight percent convicted
(thirteen of twenty-seven).155 While isolating the strong and
weak subjective intent standards into one category did cause
the acquittal rate to exceed that of the objective standard, it was
only by a few percentage points and just one different outcome
in a single case would shift those numbers. Perhaps more
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VII. THE PATILLO STANDARD, PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD,
DESERVES RECOGNITION AS THE BEST STANDARD FOR
THE UNITED STATES GOING FORWARD
As the empirical assessment above reveals, the objective
mens rea standard of the Roy/Ragansky Test may not be the
boogeyman that some, including the Watts Court, feared it to
be.156 Although the available data is probably insufficient to
draw ironclad conclusions, it seems safe to conclude that there
is parity between the subjective present intent standard and
the objective standard in terms of influencing conversion rates
for arrests, indictments, trials, and acquittals in Section 871(a)
cases. Does this necessarily support the assertion of those
champions of the status quo—that there is no true “conflict”
between the circuits to be resolved? No. Congress is considering amending Section 871(a) to apply to all congressmen and
congressmen-elect.157 If they proceed on that path, it seems
necessary, for the sake of consistency, that they choose one
standard over the other and include in the statute the definition
of the term “willfully.”
The issue remains whether a free nation like the United
States should be willing to have a Presidential threat statute that
criminally punishes offenders with a maximum of five years in
prison, without showing some subjective criminal culpability to
either injure the President or carry out the threat (hard subjective
standard) or at least that the speaker had the intent for his words
to be considered a serious threat to the President (soft subjective
standard). In short, the idea that we would punish persons using
a negligence standard for statements that could be construed as
true threats, but not intended as threats, is problematic and runs
contrary to the tradition of criminal law in the United States.158
Even if adopting a subjective intent standard will not dramatically change the outcomes of investigations and prosecutions,
as the data suggests, it is probably worth taking this stand on
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principle alone: that the United States will not punish people
for felonies without being criminally culpable for their crimes.
Proponents of the Roy/Ragansky standard are likely to
object, citing the great need to protect the President’s person
and his ability to perform his duties without interference as justification for an objective standard, at least for Section 871(a)
threats. This rationale seems dated and disconnected from the
complex reality of fending off assassination attempts and effectively investigating and monitoring those who would interfere
with Office of the President by making threats. By 1998, the
United States Secret Service had completed an operational
study, the Exceptional Case Study Project, of the thinking and
behavior of the eighty-three persons known to have attacked, or
come close to attacking, prominent public officials and figures
in the United States during the past fifty years.159 This study
revealed that it is a myth that “persons most likely to carry out
attacks are those who make direct threats.”160 In fact, “[p]ersons
who pose an actual threat often do not make threats, especially
direct threats.”161
Indeed researchers demonstrated that of the eighty-three
persons in the study, only twenty-seven (thirty-seven percent)
had a history of making verbal or written direct threats about the
target, only three (four percent) made such threats directly to the
target of the threats, and only five (seven percent) made such
threats directly to the target or law enforcement.162 Those last
two statistics help justify the factual dichotomy created by the
Patillo court when it distinguished between those defendants
who made threats “directly to the President intended,” and those
who did not. Since the more serious threat—an attack to the
person of the President—is not likely to be prevented merely
by enforcing the provisions of Section 871(a), the other goal
of the statute—preventing disruption of the President’s movements and duties—should weigh more heavily in deciding the
standard to be employed.
Research conducted by economists Benjamin Olken and
Benjamin Jones also indicates that assassination attempts have
had a less significant impact on democratized states compared
with autocracies.163 The authors concluded, “assassinations
of autocrats produce substantial changes in the country’s institutions.”164 Yet, “the . . . assassination of democrats produces no
change in institutions.”165 In other words, democracies are more
resistant to the destabilizing effects of the loss of political leaders. Considering the peaceful uprisings in the Middle East and
North Africa during 2011,166 and the often violent responses to
such movements by autocratic rulers, including the curtailing
of dissenters’ speech, assembly, and electronic communication
capabilities, it is worth reflecting for a moment as to why this
is the case. Democracies promote and protect values such as
free speech. The criminal law in democratized states, especially
the United States, typically demands that the government meet
the highest burden of proof—beyond a reasonable doubt. 167
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The criminal law in the Anglo-American tradition typically
requires proof of criminal blameworthiness, especially in
the case of felonies, which are punishable by more than a
year in prison.168 Such protections strengthen the institutions
of democracy and instill in the people a sense that even senseless and shocking attacks, such as the assassination attempt of
Representative Giffords, can be met with the peaceful resolve
of a democratic society.169
The Patillo court’s 1971 holding deserves recognition
as establishing a standard which best balances all interests
involved in Section 871(a) cases. Properly understood, the
Patillo holding created a subjective present intent requirement
for category two cases (threats not directed to the President
intended) that required proof of slightly different present intents
in each case, based upon the theory of the case, including the
third theory of disrupting presidential activity or the movements of the President. The court left open the possibility that a
different standard might be adopted in category one cases (those
directed to the President intended).170 After all, when a person
has taken the extra step of not only making a threat, but deliberately finding a way to direct that threat to the attention of the
President (by mailing it to the White House, calling the White
House, etc.), it is reasonable that a less demanding standard
might be employed because the nature of the harm is more clear
and the deliberateness of the act is more palpable. Thus, either
the Roy/Ragansky Test or the Marshall Test could be adopted
for category one cases and still be in line with the holding of
Patillo. Such a mixed standard in Section 871(a) cases is the
best possible standard going forward to protect the movements
and duties of the President, to allow for effective investigations
of assassination threats, and to protect the integrity of criminal
law in America and our democratic institutions. This standard,
coupled with the First Amendment protections of the threshold
in Watts’ “true threat” analysis, strikes the best possible balance
for a statute like Section 871(a).
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68
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69
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imposed by the Constitution, the subjective test set forth in Black must be
read into all threat statutes that criminalize pure speech.” Bagdasarian, 652
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of California, which disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s construing of the
Black opinion as requiring a subjective intent requirement for the true
threats test. See People v. Lowery, 257 P.3d 72, 78 (Cal. 2011) (adopting
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966 (11th Cir. 1983) (rejecting the subjective intent of person making threat
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123
Id. at 768 (emphasis added).
124
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See United States v. Kirk, 528 F.2d 1057, 1063-64 (5th Cir. 1976)
(utilizing the “apparent determination to carry out the threat[]” standard).
127
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